

bulletin

*The Conflict, Security
& Development Group*

There is a clear need for radical reform of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). Policing methods have been oppressive, with little or no consideration for the public's concerns.

Much of the police infrastructure was either completely destroyed or suffered severe damage as a result of the 1991–99 civil war. During three days of fighting in Freetown in January 1999 more than 300 police officers were murdered by invading rebels. The military and paramilitary have dominated law enforcement, but a sensitive and professional police force is essential to creating the conditions for free and fair elections in early 2001.

At independence from British colonial rule in 1961, the SLP was a well-trained and adequately equipped force. However, under the presidency of Siaka

Stevens (1968–85) the SLP became highly politicised: the Inspector General of Police became a member of the Cabinet; and the force became a repressive arm of the government. Nepotism, cronyism, and political favouritism informed the selection and posting of all police personnel to such an extent that candidates were allowed to join the force irrespective of their skills – for instance, many individuals were illiterate.

In response to several attempted coups, Stevens sought to neutralise the power of the armed forces by limiting their budget and by creating a heavily armed police unit – the Internal Security Unit, now known as the Special Security Division. This strategy kept Stevens in power, but, after he retired, successive military regimes deliberately emasculated the SLP by denying it essential resources and development training.

For the past 15 years, police officers have rarely been provided with uniforms or basic equipment. The state of police barracks and stations throughout the country is truly

Also in this issue Dr Johanna Mendelson Forman on the World Bank and security-sector reform ... *Operational Focus* by Gary Littlechild on the Oslo Guidelines ... *Policy Brief* by Dr Comfort Ero on the Lusaka Agreement ... plus regular features *Pointers, Timeline, Web Watch* and *Update*.

appalling: many lack easy access to clean water; toilet facilities (where they exist) are primitive; and basic hygiene and disease control are almost non-existent. The cell accommodation in all police stations fails to meet international standards. This not only breaches the human rights of the prisoner, but also those of the arresting officer, who is obliged to detain suspects under inhumane conditions.

Until the November 1999 budget, a constable was paid only Le41,000 (\$15) per month. As a result, he/she would often supplement their income through corrupt practices, such as manning make shift check-points. Wages have effectively been doubled, however, following the decision (in the budget) to replace the compensatory rice allowance with cash. Nevertheless, the salary barely meets daily requirements.

A consequence of the SLP's neglect is that the general public has lost confidence in the efficiency and probity of the force.

Oversight

The Inspector General of Police is responsible for administration and operational control. Under the 1991 Constitution, accountability rests with the Police Council. This is the only formal body to provide civilian oversight of the SLP, but it is narrowly based. Membership consists only of the Vice President, the Minister for Safety and Security, the Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector General, two nominees of the President, a representative of the Bar Association, and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission.

The Council advises the President on a range of policy issues, including financing and general management, and is responsible for all personnel issues and procedures. Police budgeting and financing is within the purview of the Council, but, in reality, it takes no part

in the process. Instead, the Minister of Finance fixes the financial provision almost unilaterally. As a result, the police budget reflects the views of the Finance Ministry, rather than the needs of the force. The effect is that, for this financial year, the budget is some 50% less than what is ideally required.

The SLP receives Le370 million (\$148,000) per month to sustain its operational capacity. This may appear a large sum, but when running costs are taken into account, the money does not go very far. Moreover, the 1999 budget allocates almost five times as much of the country's gross domestic product to the military – Le20.2 billion compared to Le4.5bn.

The Ministry for Safety and Security acts as the secretariat for the Police Council, but it has neither the necessary staff nor the expertise. The Constitution does not grant the Ministry power over the police, beyond its membership of the Council. Indeed, the Police Council rarely meets, and then only to endorse requests made by the Inspector General. In its eight years of existence, there is no evidence that any member, other than the Inspector General, has raised a substantial issue for debate. As a result, the Council is widely regarded as not being particularly effective.

There is a parliamentary select committee that oversees internal affairs, but it convenes only occasionally and, when it does, tends to focus on the interests of members, rather than on strategic issues.

The development of transparent police accountability, both to national government and to local people, is a major part of the work being done by the Commonwealth Police Development Task Force (CPDTF). The aim is to create a community police service, which is accountable to the people and is not an organ of the government.

Vision for the future

On 14 August 1998, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah outlined his vision for the future of the SLP – which became the ‘Policing Charter’. He stressed that the 7,200-strong SLP should work with the community to ensure stability in the country, and highlighted the importance of human rights and equal opportunities. The SLP subsequently released a mission statement, aptly titled a ‘Force for Good’, which now forms the basis for police reform in Sierra Leone.

One notable feature of the SLPs decline has been its failure to communicate

aspirations, and customs are taken into consideration.

In Waterloo, in September 1998, there were consultations between the community and the police on how to achieve better local policing. Pilot partnership projects are also taking place in Bo, Lungi, Congo Cross, and Kissy, and Local Needs Policing is spreading as resources become available.

After years of abuse, the nature of police deployment is also under review. In Freetown, for instance, large numbers of armed officers were assigned to protect private business concerns and individuals.

This situation is now changing, and 150 armed police officers will be patrolling the streets at night, along with members of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). This means that police officers are serving all members of the population, rather than a select few.

It is estimated that more than 100 traffic officers will also be transferred to crime-prevention duties. The objective is to



Photo: Associated Press

A Sierra Leonean police officer signals for assistance as a crowd of citizens register to vote in 1996.

with the community. Future policing will be based on ‘Local Needs Policing’, often known as community policing. The intention is to devolve decision-making and to decentralise control to the lowest possible level. Local police commanders should thus be able to meet the needs of society without having to refer to regional or national headquarters. Such a scheme relies on paramount chiefs, community and religious leaders, youth organisations, parastatals, and other members of the public working closely with police officers in order to ensure that local concerns,

increase public confidence in the police – that they are looking for criminals and not minor traffic violations.

An immediate priority is to tackle corruption, criminal activity, and misconduct by police officers. In Freetown, a department has been set up to investigate misdemeanours. There are three components to this initiative:

- education and training courses to instil police ethics;
- those suspected of involvement in serious criminal misconduct will be monitored by a team of plain-clothed officers; and

- an investigation section – which is the largest element – will bring offending officers to justice.

Efforts will also be made to improve officers' living accommodation, their working space, and their conditions of service. The Sierra Leone Police Policy Team is working hard to modernise all police procedures, and to ensure that, with the help of the government and international donors, the force is adequately resourced, financed, and equipped to perform its duties.

A great deal has already been achieved, but there is still much to be done to create a

strong police force. A tremendous amount of sensible policing – backed by civil society – still needs to occur. Unless an environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections is created over the course of the next year, Sierra Leoneans will be unable to exercise their right to vote in peace and without fear of intimidation.

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Keith Biddle, Acting Inspector General of the Sierra Leone Police.

policy brief

The warring factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) agreed at a meeting in Kampala, on 8 April 2000, to a new deadline of 14 April for a complete cessation of hostilities and the disengagement of forces. There is little optimism, though, about government and rebel forces ending the 22-month regional and internal conflict. Numerous declarations have been made since the Lusaka Agreement was signed on 10 July 1999 by DRC President Laurent Kabila, the five neighbouring states of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and the leaders of the three Congolese rebel groups.

The UN hosted a much publicised peace conference in New York in January, at which African leaders again signalled their intention to abide by the terms of the accord. However, no significant movement took place on the ground. The international community has increasingly become a bystander in the war. Resolution 1291 expanded the UN Mission in the DRC to 5,537 military

personnel, including 500 observers. But only around 100 military and 56 civilian staff have been deployed in the Congo. There is a limit to what the UN can achieve when there is little peace to keep.

Yet the Lusaka Agreement is the best framework on offer to tie together all of the strands of this complex war. It addresses the internal political crisis in the DRC, as well as the regional security demands of Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda. However, all sides to the conflict have prevaricated over its implementation: Kabila has imposed restrictions on future UN peacekeeping activities; rebels have continually ignored the peace process; and neighbouring states have shown little commitment to end their military involvement in a war that continues to yield profits.

The viability of the Lusaka accord depends on the parties to the conflict. This latest cease-fire might hold because all of the key actors are facing mounting difficulties at home. The war in the DRC has exposed the volatile nature of the internal order that exists in several central and southern African states.

Dr Comfort Ero, Research Fellow

operational focus

The Oslo Guidelines of 1994 were designed to standardise and to formalise the principles and procedures to be followed when Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA) are used for humanitarian emergencies in peacetime. Their use has generally been negotiated on a case-by-case, bilateral basis between the sending and receiving parties. MCDA refers to any resource, including personnel, information, and equipment, that belongs to a government-organised military or to a civil-defence institution.

In large-scale emergencies, the limits of traditional relief mechanisms are soon reached and exceeded. The end of the Cold War presented the UN with an opportunity to make greater use of the large number of military resources that might be available to help fill this 'humanitarian gap'. At the same time, donor countries wanted greater value for money from their vast injection of resources into disaster-relief operations. It was clear, however, that old sensitivities about the primary role of the military and possible hidden agendas would have to be addressed.

In January 1994, at the request of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Norway hosted a conference on the use of MCDA in disaster-relief operations. The resulting Guidelines are non-binding, but 45 countries and 25 non-governmental and international organisations contributed to the drafting process.

MCDA can be used to assist with the following tasks: reconnaissance; search-and-rescue missions and evacuation; co-ordination and provision of relief services; medical and ground logistical support; and airlift and air-drop missions.

The aim of the Guidelines is to provide a basic framework for the use of MCDA in an attempt to avoid fatal delays

The Oslo Guidelines

and the duplication of efforts, as well as to maximise the use of existing resources. Operations are to be fully transparent, neutral, and impartial. Fundamental aspects of the Guidelines include:

- that provision of relief support is at the request, or with the consent, of the receiving state;
- that overall responsibility and authority for the relief effort lies with the receiving state;
- that the provision of relief support should be at no cost to the receiving state, unless otherwise agreed;
- that international MCDA personnel deployed on disaster-relief operations should be unarmed (security being provided by the receiving state);
- that states should facilitate the transit of MCDA by simplifying, for example, their regulations for overflight and customs; and
- that MCDA should complement existing civilian-led relief mechanisms.

The Guidelines have met with mixed success. The principals were successfully applied in response to the earthquake in Nepal in 1993–94, but less so during the floods in Mozambique in 2000. A key problem is that often the individuals who hold relevant positions in the national staff are not aware of the Guidelines, and, on occasion, a state does not refer to them on purpose because of its own political agenda.

operational focus

continued

In March 1996, the DHA established a Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) to act as a focal point for the request, mobilisation, deployment, and co-ordination of MCDA. Although the MCDU has its origin in relatively less contentious and 'simple' natural and technological disasters, it has found itself frequently engaged in complex emergencies. In 1998, the DHA changed its name to the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to reflect its broader role.

However, the use of MCDA in complex emergencies gives rise to various problems. For instance, the Guidelines grant military and/or civil-defence personnel engaged in simple humanitarian operations the status of experts on mission for the UN – according to article VI of the UN Convention on Privileges and Immunities. But there

is no equivalent legal definition in relation to complex emergencies. Similarly, the concept of a recipient state can be at issue during complex emergencies. MCDA resources were mobilised during the Kosovo and East Timor crises of 1999; in legal technical terms the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Government of Indonesia respectively were the 'recipient' states. But the practical situation meant that the UN acted as the receiving state.

OCHA is hoping to tackle these and other issues at a NATO-hosted seminar on 18–19 May 2000. It is anticipated that a new set of guidelines will be presented to a high-level international conference in Vienna in 2001.

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Extracts from an article by Gary Littlechild, UN OCHA representative in Brussels.

pointers

► Croatia's centre-left coalition government has been particularly active in the security field since coming to power in January 2000. Demonstrating what elections can mean to security policy, Croatia's transformation could energise reform throughout the Balkans. The new government announced immediate cuts to the defence budget and plans to trim the armed forces to peacetime proportions. Budgetary subventions for the Bosnian Croat military and veterans' pensions were stopped, providing a major boost to security-sector reform in Bosnia-

Herzegovina, which began in 1999. A rapprochement with Montenegro should end their dispute over the strategic Prevlaka peninsula. And Zagreb's 'Europeanisation' policy includes a decision not to implement a long-standing agreement with Israel to upgrade its 30 MiG-21 fighters and its T-55 main-battle tanks, in favour of Western armaments.

► Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone intend to revitalise and extend the Mano River Union – originally set up to harmonise trade and to co-operate on economic affairs. It has been paralysed by a decade of civil war. New proposals include a joint committee to monitor and ensure security along their mutual borders. All three countries have accused each other of harbouring and supporting dissidents, and have suffered the devastating consequences of refugee flows.

The World Bank and security- sector reform

Until the early 1990s, the World Bank's concept of public-sector reform was limited, and consideration was not given to human-security issues. The Bank contributed to development through its huge infrastructure programmes, but did not insist on good governance as part of the lending process. Military expenditure was viewed simply in terms of the trade off with the public sector, rather than as part of a broader security-sector-reform equation.

The Bank's Articles of Agreement prevent it from making political judgements on the actions of its members. In the late 1980s, however, an increasing emphasis on the human-rights record of states resulted in a review of how political developments might impact on the economic criteria that govern the Bank's decision-making process. In 1987, its general counsel concluded that, 'political events which have a bearing on the economic conditions of a member or on a member's ability to implement a project or the Bank's ability to supervise a project may be taken into consideration by the Board'.

In 1991, the World Bank began to consider the relationship between good

governance and development. The *World Bank Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development* noted that:

'the challenge of development, in the broadest sense, is to improve the quality of life.

Especially in the world's poorest countries, a better quality of life generally calls for higher incomes – but it involves much more ... any notion of strictly economic progress must, at a minimum, look beyond growth in per capita income to reduction of poverty and greater equity, to progress in education, health, and nutrition, and to the protection of the environment.'

The idea that 'governance matters' moved the Bank into a new period of technical advice and lending. This was partly in response to the rise in internal conflicts in Africa, Asia, and Central America, but was also a reaction to the growing role of international organisations in peace building. The increasing number of intrastate conflicts and 'failed states' after the Cold War illustrated how investments in development could be lost as a result of insecurity.

Although the Bank does not have a holistic approach to security-sector reform, there are three clear points of entry for its involvement: public-sector financial reform; post-conflict reconstruction; and poverty-reduction strategies.

Public-sector financial reform

In 1991, the Bank's guidelines on military expenditure focused on how resources spent on the armed forces might 'crowd out' other types of social investment. Today, the Bank no longer looks at military spending as simply being 'unproductive', but considers such expenditure in terms of the broader question

‘Security is a development issue connected to the poverty and development mandate of the [World] Bank. One in five persons is living in a country in conflict. The World Bank needs a framework that includes human security if it is going to play a clear role.’

Jean-Louis Sarbib, World Bank Vice President for the Africa Region, 1999.

of governance. Military budgets (the creation and review of which are often closed to public scrutiny) are notorious for providing opportunities for governments to engage in systematic corruption. This situation highlights the need for accountability and transparency in order to ensure that the needs of all citizens are adequately met.

Post-conflict reconstruction

The Bank has assisted countries in transition through:

- demilitarisation;
- demobilisation;
- demining;
- community development;
- education for war victims; and
- development of alternative livelihoods for former combatants.

In 1997, it produced a framework for a more comprehensive approach to post-conflict reconstruction. The main elements dealt with the timing and scale of its engagement, and required that assistance be accelerated to accommodate a country’s immediate and short-term needs. The Bank also created a modest post-conflict fund (\$22 million) and set up a specialised unit within its Social Development Division to serve as a technical centre.

The ability to deliver small grants to support early reconstruction has strengthened the Bank’s regional operating units, and has provided a platform for its larger projects in this area. Funds for demobilisation in countries like Liberia, Rwanda, and Sierra

Leone have also encouraged other donors to become involved. While these efforts are important and groundbreaking, they are only the start of what should become a central part of the Bank’s development portfolio in countries emerging from war.

In spring 1999, the Bank hosted a meeting on the subject of micro-disarmament, security, and development. The symposium discussed how the illegal flow of light weapons and the increasingly intractable nature of conflict could undermine the Bank’s operational policies. No consensus was reached on the Bank’s specific role in disarmament, or on the idea that security conditions could be used as a way to determine readiness for the normalisation of lending. The expression of such ideas within the context of the Bank’s development work, though, has created a window for more in-depth policy discussion, and has raised the profile of security-sector reform in the Bank.

Poverty-reduction strategies

Of the world’s poorest 20 countries, 19 have suffered a major conflict in the past 10 years, and World Bank research has underscored the centrality of security to an individual’s ability to move out of poverty in the developing world. Poverty-reduction strategies need to recognise the impact of insecurity on human development. Since 1980, the volume of Bank lending to post-conflict countries has increased by over 800% to some \$6.2 billion, and accounted for 16% of its lending commitments in 1998.

Future direction

Having taken the step of recognising the importance of security to development, it is now necessary to ensure that security concerns are fully integrated into the Bank's policies and programmes. At present, it does not support police training or provide funds for equipment. But the growing demand for this type of assistance has put pressure on the Bank to review this important area of governance. Indeed, in a survey of 69 firms – conducted for the *World Bank Development Report 1998: The Role of the State* – security was rated as the number one risk facing investors. Given that the international community is under pressure to support peace operations through financing the creation of indigenous police forces, the Bank may yet become another source of backing in emergency situations. Current conditions in East Timor, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone show the importance of citizen security and local policing in any plans for reconstruction.

The Bank needs a clear framework on how to engage with security issues and security-sector reform. Policies addressing post-conflict reconstruction are a first step, but more explicit recognition that security is a critical development issue is needed. It is necessary that:

- the Bank develop more analytical and practical work on security-sector reform. Strengthening security needs to become a central part of its support for sustainable growth and poverty reduction;

- a wider knowledge base be established, drawing on the Bank's experience in post-conflict reconstruction and good governance;
- further analysis of military expenditure be conducted, focussing on the relationship between good governance and controlling corruption. Financial-sector reform will have to bring military spending into the same framework as the rest of the national budget process. This implies a preparedness to fund initiatives aimed at improving financial management in the military, as well as in other parts of government;
- the Bank builds on its comparative advantage in order to promote security-sector-reform policy dialogue. This type of work will require a wide array of partnerships with international organisations, bilateral donors, and non-governmental groups; and
- the Bank supports programmes that address law and order, so that both the criminal and civil aspects of judicial reform are tackled.

Conclusion

The sensitive nature of security-sector reform – which is still a new area of work for the World Bank – requires consensus and strong political commitment. But it is clear that, without incorporating security issues into post-conflict reconstruction programmes, there can be no recovery, no reduction of poverty, and, certainly, no capacity to support good governance and accountability in war-torn societies.

Dr Johanna Mendelson Forman is Senior Policy Advisor for Democracy and Governance at USAID, Bureau for Policy Planning. She co-authored the September 1999 World Bank Study: *Security, Poverty Reduction & Sustainable Development*. The views in this article are those of the author and do not represent official USAID or World Bank policy.

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15–19 May 2000 Humanitarian Challenges in the Midst of War.

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21 June 2000 Strategies for Ending the Arms Trade to Africa.

28 June 2000 Can the Lusaka Agreement Deliver in the Democratic Republic of Congo?

For more information, e-mail africacentre@gn.apc.org

31 May 2000 **The Interface between the Humanitarian and Political Agendas** (London,UK)

Meeting organised by the Overseas Development Institute. E-mail meetings@odi.org.uk

31 May 2000 **Post War Reconstruction in Huehuetenango, Guatemala** (Oxford,UK)

Organised by the Refugee Studies Centre. Talk by Dr Jenny Pearce. E-mail Dominique.Attala@rscedu@qeh.ox.ac.uk

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www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol
UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

Site includes:

- the Oslo Guidelines;
- country reports, including demining databases;
- information on requests for Military and Civil Defence Assets; and
- training courses.

www.worldbank.org/postconflict
The World Bank's Post-Conflict Reconstruction Site.

See the following reports:

- Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects;
- Security, Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development: the Challenges of a New Millennium; and
- papers on the World Bank's experiences with post-conflict reconstruction.

www.fewer.org
Forum for Early Warning and Early Response

Includes information on warning/response in the Caucasus and the Great Lakes region.

www.iss.co.za
The Institute for Security Studies

Research on Africa includes:

- South African defence;
- arms management;
- early warning;
- peace missions;
- corruption and governance; and
- crime, policing and prevention

The editor does not accept responsibility for the content of any of the websites listed.

Dr Chris Smith provided radio and television stations with comment on US President Bill Clinton's visit to South Asia, and on Pakistan's nuclear-weapons programme. In April, he worked with a DFID team on a strategic conflict-impact assessment in Sri Lanka.

Colonel Philip Wilkinson OBE continued to comment on emerging military peace-support operations and civil-military doctrine. He assisted in the planning of a major civil-military peace-support seminar at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK. Philip has also started to write a manual for practitioners on how to conduct security-sector reform.

Dr Susan Woodward published five articles on south-east Europe, including a contribution to the Conflict Prevention Network final report on security in the western Balkans. She lectured on 'Lessons from the Balkans: US Foreign Policy Confronts the New Civil Wars' at Whitman College, US, and spoke on 'Precarious Missions: the UN in the Balkan Civil Wars' at Vaughan College. She participated in an OSCE-sponsored workshop in Kiev on a political settlement for the Transnistrian conflict, and took part in a Greece-UK-US conference on Cyprus. Susan chaired a meeting of the Standing Committee on Military Matters, Bosnia and Herzegovina, held by the UK Ministry of Defence. In Budapest, she contributed to a seminar hosted by the Central European University for the Swedish Government-funded Independent International Commission on Kosovo. Susan also took part in a workshop entitled 'Albanians and their Neighbours', organised at the request of the Hungarian Government by the Project on Ethnic Relations in Princeton, US. In addition, she conducted field research for a conflict-impact assessment in Moldova.

Nici Dahrendorf attended a UN Development Programme (UNDP) workshop on 'Governance and Conflict Prevention' in New York. She held meetings in New York with organisations and academic institutions on two of her research areas: trafficking in women and children; and justice in transition, and the relationship between the security sector and judicial reform. She attended a British Council conference (with Chris Smith) in Sicily, Italy, entitled 'Framing the Peace' – Nici spoke at a workshop on humanitarian principles and actions, examining the effectiveness of international human-rights and humanitarian law in conflict situations.

Dr Comfort Ero attended a conference in Geneva on engaging non-state actors in the Ottawa Convention. She has written a 1999–2000 survey and forecast on West Africa for the South African Institute of International Affairs Yearbook 2000–01.

Dylan Hendrickson participated in the UNDP workshop on 'Governance and Conflict Prevention'.

Richard Jones began editing and marketing the third Working Paper: 'Sierra Leone's Security Complex' by Comfort Ero (which will be published in early May). In addition, he continued to work on the design, structure, and content of the Group's forthcoming journal, as well as on other design, production, and editorial projects for the Centre for Defence Studies and the CSDG.

Roxanne Bazergan attended a conference at the Institute for Commonwealth Studies, UK, on 'Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Commonwealth Countries' with Philip Wilkinson and Comfort Ero. She is currently conducting research with Comfort on small-arms proliferation in Africa.

Thomas Withington has been commissioning book reviews for the Group's journal. He also attended a debate on national missile defence, and co-authored a chapter for a report on ballistic-missile proliferation. Thomas is currently completing an article on India's nuclear policy.

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