

A survey of Security System Reform in the Baltics, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Southeast Europe

Tanja Petovar

About this survey

The main SSR challenge facing the post-communist states is to limit the influence of the old military and secret police cadre and to restore democratic control over the use of force by state institutions. To date, the primary impetus for reforms in the security sector has been the desire for integration into the EU Stabilisation and Association process and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This survey, commissioned by the OECD-DAC, found that most of the countries in the region are currently developing new national security concepts and defense doctrines that are better adapted to the post-Cold War security environment. However, while political jargon in the surveyed regions is rich with phrases that reflect the impact of the international community on policy documents and political declarations about security, this does not signify genuine local ownership of declared reform programmes or the SSR concept.

Tanja Petovar is a private consultant working on democracy and capacity-building programmes in southeast Europe.

The **Conflict, Security and Development Group** is a leading international resource for research, analysis, training and expert policy advice on issues at the intersection of security and development. CSDG was established at King's College London in 1999 with the aim of bridging the academic and policy communities. Its core mandate is to deepen understanding about the development challenges confronting societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and to help translate this knowledge into practical agendas for change at local, national, regional and international levels.

CSDG's **Governance and Security** programme is concerned with how international assistance in the security domain (notably the SSR agenda) can be better tailored to the political context and the needs of aid recipients.

Conflict, Security and Development Group
School of Social Science and Public Policy
King's College London
Strand, London
WC2R 2LS, UK

Tel: +44(0)20 7848 1984
Fax: +44(0)20 7848 2748
www.securityanddevelopment.org

CSDG Papers

Number 6 ■ May 2005

A Survey of Security System Reform in the Baltics, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Southeast Europe

Tanja Petovar

Contents

Summary	3
Chapter 1: Introduction	5
Chapter 2: Information availability	6
Chapter 3: Context for reform	8
Baltic states and Slovenia	11
Southeast Europe	12
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	17
Chapter 4: How security is identified	19
Chapter 5: Assessment of findings	21
Chapter 6: Conclusions	28
Annex A: Selected bibliography of SSR in the Baltics, Southeast Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States	29
Box 1. Understanding the communist legacy	7
Box 2. The role of ‘shadow’ security systems	9
Box 3. The national security concept of Latvia (unofficial translation)	11
Box 4. The enduring legacy of the KGB	22
Box 5. Separating ‘profound’ from ‘cosmetic’ reforms	23

Summary

The main SSR challenge facing the post-communist states is to limit the influence of the old military and secret police cadre and to restore democratic control over the use of force by state institutions. This challenge encompasses not just internal military and police reforms but also the establishment of impartial judiciaries, the strengthening of legislatures, and the empowerment of civil society. A number of states have made great strides in democratising their societies and security systems, but most continue to face significant challenges in strengthening democratic governance of their security systems.

The primary impetus for SSR in the regions surveyed is the desire for integration into the EU Stabilisation and Association process and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)¹. This has given the military a new-found legitimacy in many countries due to their central importance in the accession processes. Yet an attitude where national security systems are viewed as being above the rule of law still dominates in the majority of the observed societies. A key SSR challenge is therefore to prevent the corruption of the newly-born democratic institutions by the 'old spirit' of governance.

Most of the countries surveyed are currently in the process of developing new national security concepts and defense doctrines that are better adapted to the post-Cold War security environment. The security challenges facing the post-communist states today extend beyond the responsibilities and capabilities of traditional military and police, requiring a broader approach that involves building basic political consensus on how to create a functioning state and healthy civil society. These processes have been heavily influenced by Western donors and defence establishments.

Yet the survey found that while political jargon in the surveyed regions is rich with phrases that reflect the impact of the international community on policy documents and political declarations about security, it does not, however, signify genuine local ownership of declared reform programmes or new concepts of security such as SSR. The term SSR—though widely used in the former Yugoslavia, for example—often has a different meaning than the OECD-DAC sense of the word. Few people in the region, including

¹ This survey was managed by the Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) at King's College London (www.securityanddevelopment.org). For further information on the methodology for the survey, the key findings, and the implications for donors, see *CSDG Papers* No. 2, *A Global Survey of Security System Reform*, by D. Hendrickson.

policymakers and members of security establishments, view security in a holistic sense.

Much international assistance for SSR in SEE and CIS countries continues to focus on bilateral training and technical assistance, with much less emphasis placed by donors on structural reform or cultural change in the security system. This underscores the importance of linking donor engagements to reform-oriented outcomes and providing assistance in ways that serve as a stimulus to changes in the governance climate within the security system.

Chapter 1

Introduction²

This chapter presents the findings of a survey of security system reform which covered 18 post-communist countries in three sub-regions: the Baltics, Southeast Europe (SEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).³

The main SSR challenge facing the post-communist states is to limit the influence of the old military and secret police cadre and to restore democratic control over the use of force by state institutions. This challenge encompasses not just internal military and police reforms but also the establishment of impartial judiciaries, the strengthening of legislatures, and the empowerment of civil society. The Baltic States and Slovenia, in particular, have made great strides in democratising their societies and security systems, as recognised by their recent nominations for EU membership. The other countries continue to face significant challenges in strengthening democratic governance of their security systems. With the benefit of substantial international assistance, progress has, nonetheless, been relatively steady and visible even if the process has been uneven and remains far from complete.

This report is structured as follows:

- Chapter 2 assesses the challenges of gathering information on security issues in the post-communist countries.⁴
- Chapter 3 examines the context for SSR in this region, highlighting the factors that have put security on government reform agendas.
- Chapter 4 focuses on how ‘security’ is defined in the post-communist states, and contrasts this with the DAC SSR concept.
- Chapter 5 assesses the status of SSR in the three sub-regions, highlighting key factors that are necessary to understand current trends.

² This paper was first published by the OECD-DAC as part of a report entitled *Security System Reform and Governance*, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris 2005.

³ The three *Baltic states* are: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania; the nine *SEE countries* are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo), and Slovenia; and the six *CIS states* are: the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. The survey did not cover the Central and Eastern European countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, all of which are members of the OECD.

⁴ Annex A provides a select bibliography of SSR in the post-communist countries.

Chapter 2

Information availability

Information for this survey was gathered from a variety of sources including interviews with civil society and government officials in the region, the Internet, and documents produced by think tanks in the regions. Due to the political relevance of SSR, information in this subject area is increasingly available, though the focus is mainly on individual components of state security systems rather than on the system as a whole. Furthermore, much of the data and analysis on SSR in these regions is produced by outside organisations such as the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the OSCE Mission to this country has been very active in providing advice to governmental bodies, such as the legislature, on security-related topics. There are nonetheless a number of specialised institutions that deal with SSR emerging in the Baltic States.

The post-communist states are heavily reliant on external organisations for data and expertise on SSR, which is problematic for various reasons. When conducting research, external organisations often turn to their contacts in the legislative branch of governments in post-communist states, whose members may not be well informed about security-related issues. A similar problem emerges when outsiders work through liaison officers from the national defence and interior ministries, or even from the secret services. These officers often have little influence (or specialist knowledge of) their security agencies. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for them to be closely monitored by counter-intelligence elements of the secret services (the surviving bastion of the old communist guard) and, therefore, may not be able to provide outsiders with a true picture of how the state security apparatus functions.

Despite the long shadow of the communist past that hangs over governments in the countries surveyed, most are now developing new national security concepts. While there are new and useful policy documents that indicate official thinking on SSR, in practice these documents are often simply a reworking of the old communist party documents, albeit somewhat 'modernised' by the introduction of new democratic concepts and terminology (see Box 1). Having local experts with insider knowledge would help to clarify the situation, though their numbers are limited as a

consequence of which much current analysis reflects an external, often superficial perspective on the institutional culture within post-communist security establishments.

Box 1. Understanding the communist legacy

In Serbia the national legislature passed a law in 2002 to reform the old state security service (renamed the Security Information Agency, or BIA), but a quick glance at the law's text clearly shows the heavy influence of old communist thinking on security matters. The structure of the secret service was changed only cosmetically, and the only true element of civil control added was the formation of a National Security Council, headed by the Prime Minister. The individuals who make up that Council, however, have been accused of using the secret service as an instrument to maintain their positions of political power, rather than to tackle the serious threats to national security. There is little useful and knowledgeable analysis available on these matters within the body of SSR literature that is being produced for the international community.

Chapter 3

Context for reform

The primary impetus for SSR in the regions surveyed is the desire for integration into the EU Stabilisation and Association process and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Countries aspiring to NATO Alliance membership⁵ have joined the Membership Action Plan (MAP).⁶ The Baltic States and Slovenia, which will be joining the EU and NATO in May 2004, have gone much further than the SEE and CIS countries in developing their democracies and incorporating EU standards and regulations into their domestic legislation. Romania and Bulgaria will likely be invited to join in 2007.

The CIS countries have not been invited to apply for a myriad of different reasons. Many political forces in both the European Union and the United States consider the value of including these countries in the Euro-Atlantic fold negligible compared to the potential harm it may cause to the West's relations with Russia. The CIS countries generally suffer from rampant crime and corruption, as well as having depressed economies that would need large financial injections from the West to ready them for EU/NATO membership. These factors, combined with the Russian Federation's openly stated concern over possible NATO encroachment on its western borders, have led many in the West to view the CIS countries as a convenient 'buffer zone' between themselves and the Russians.⁷

Progress on SSR in all three sub-regions will be closely tied to progress on wider economic and political reforms. The UNDP Human Development indicators give a sense of the vast differences among countries in the regions:

⁵ Other nations that have applied to join NATO are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia and Romania.

⁶ The NATO Washington Summit in April 1999 unveiled the Membership Action Plan (MAP) concept that has four essential components: a tailored Annual National Plan (ANP) that identifies key targets spanning the political/economic, defence/military, resources, security, and legal dimensions of Alliance membership; a feedback mechanism by which NAC members and the partner can jointly assess progress; a clearinghouse for coordinating security assistance from NATO members to the partner; enhanced defence planning at the country level that establishes and reviews agreed planning targets.

⁷ On 2 April 2004 NATO expanded to include seven new members: Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. During the lengthy ratification process, NATO countries sought to appease Russian fears about expansion in different ways. But when four Belgian F-16s touched down at a former Soviet military base in Lithuania, Russian officials responded with outrage. President Putin later took advantage of German Chancellor Schröder's one-day visit to Moscow to assure the West that Russia does not fear NATO's expansion to the East.

Slovenia is ranked highest (29), Estonia (42), Croatia (48), Lithuania (49), Latvia (53), Ukraine (80), Georgia (81), Azerbaijan (88), with Albania (92) lowest in the ranking. Notwithstanding these economic differences and their diverse historical and cultural traditions, these countries do share in common the legacy of a communist past which has heavily shaped the direction of SSR in this region.

The Balkans are made up of a number of conflict-torn societies where the fragile peace and a semblance of law and order are today being sustained by the heavy presence of international military forces and international agencies. SFOR and EU forces play this role in Bosnia and Herzegovina; KFOR in Kosovo/Serbia; NATO-EU forces in Macedonia, and the UN forces have until recently done so in Croatia. A continuing challenge to peace and stability in these countries is the need to bring to justice the perpetrators of war crimes. In most cases the perpetrators are former members of armed forces or are still active in them, and this impedes efforts to establish democratic controls over the security system (see Box 2). Other security challenges in both SEE and CIS countries are economically motivated ethnic conflicts, the presence of old Soviet cadres in governing regimes, drugs trafficking, terrorism and unstable borders.

Box 2. The role of 'shadow' security systems

Western security experts have had difficulty understanding the so-called 'parallel' or 'shadow' security systems that operate in the Balkans behind the scenes of the formal state security establishments. Accused war criminals such as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, for instance, who are wanted by international authorities in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been able to successfully evade arrest for several years. This is likely because they have had access to official state intelligence along with well-organised logistical support provided by former or serving members of the security establishments. This has enabled them to consistently evade arrest in areas with large contingents of foreign troops. These 'shadow' security structures co-exist alongside—and in various ways interact with—official security bodies, yet are by their very nature above the law and, therefore, immune from any civil control.

One of the key challenges of SSR in the surveyed regions is preventing the corruption of newly-born democratic institutions through the transfer of the 'old spirit' of governance into the new political institutions. An attitude where national security systems are viewed as being above the rule of law still dominates in the majority of the observed societies,⁸ as clearly seen after the 12 March 2003 assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. The assassins were all active or retired special police officers belonging to the state security service, or their criminal cohorts from organised crime circles. The government declared a state of emergency, during which the security forces (many of them closely associated with the accused assassins) were given carte blanche powers.

⁸ The introduction of new 'anti-terror' legislation in parts of Europe and in the US, which has undermined civil rights, has been used as a pretext by certain post-communist states to enact new policies that undermine human rights and democratic values in the name of ensuring security.

Over 10,000 Serbian citizens were arrested during the state of emergency, even though most had nothing to do with the murder. The media was placed under government censorship, journalists were arrested for publishing articles not in keeping with government propaganda, and all civil liberties were suspended. The security forces and government were placed above the law by the state of emergency decree, which led to widespread abuses of power. Though seen in the beginning as a necessary and even desirable action against rampant organised crime, the state of emergency soon lost nearly all of its popular support as the abuses and selectivity of the state's action became evident. This also contributed to the backlash by voters against the government at early parliamentary elections held on 28 December 2003.

Despite these challenges, SSR is occurring. The internal impetus is popular and there is political recognition of the urgent need for democratic change in broader society. The problem is that the reasons behind such impetus are often of concern. Civil society, in the Western sense of the word, is generally weak, while its effect on SSR is negligible for a variety of reasons. Civil society in these countries is mostly composed of those who have a strong, built-in aversion to security forces, in general, and almost no understanding or knowledge of their internal functioning and external purpose. This leads to civil society often adopting a confrontational approach with governments when it comes to SSR. This confused internal drive for reform is in turn reinforced by external pressure and support emanating from the EU, NATO, the OSCE, international financial institutions, and the Council of Europe, including the Stability Pact in SEE.⁹

The pace of change varies enormously from the Baltic States and Slovenia, where it has been very rapid, to the gradual processes of nation-state building in the Western Balkans and post-Soviet states in the CIS region. All countries, except Belarus, are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, the countries differ substantially as far as their legal structures, accountability mechanisms, surveillance powers, and controls are concerned. Political and administrative culture, media freedom, public opinion and democratic values are factors that make these differences even bigger. Due to the authoritarian traditions that still prevail in the CIS and Western Balkans, a new political class still exercises power through prerogatives/ordinances, rather than through democratically elected institutions and legal mechanisms. At the same time, most of the new constitutions in the surveyed regions provide for elected parliaments with instruments to control crucial decisions affecting national defence and security (budgets, the declaration of war, etc.).

⁹ NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme includes 'ensuring democratic control of defence forces' as one of its five objectives. The Membership Action Plan (MAP) for aspiring NATO members has included detailed requirements under the PfP programmes. The European Union's PHARE and TACIT Democracy Programmes include projects to promote reform of judiciary, oversight by legislatures of the military sphere, education of police and border guards, etc. The OSCE and the Council of Europe have cooperated to support police reform and access to justice programmes, strengthen democratic oversight of reforms, and establish a code of police ethics such as the Council of Europe Code of Police Ethics.

Politically binding international agreements such as the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security¹⁰ and other ethical codes have been set up along with Council of Europe standards, which form a basis for further harmonisation of national laws with the EU standards.

Baltic states and Slovenia

The Baltic states have rapidly moved towards integration with the EU and NATO. They have also built close political and economic ties with the Nordic countries. Slovenia, which is located at the geopolitical border of South and Central Europe, has also successfully joined numerous regional political, military and economic associations of the Central European nations (Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary), as well as the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe.

The Baltic states' new constitutions provide for a range of fundamental rights. Most laws relating to governance of the military and police have been drafted together with international experts¹¹. New provisions for legislative oversight provide a framework for accountability and transparency of the organisational, planning, budgeting, administrative and operational functions of the military and police, their services and agencies. National parliaments have gradually established effective control over these institutions. In their national security concepts, SSR is viewed in the context of wider economic and social reforms (see for example the case of Latvia, Box 3).

Box. 3 The National Security Concept of Latvia (unofficial translation)

This law was adopted by the Saeima on 16 February 1995.

National interests of the Republic of Latvia

The national security of the Republic of Latvia is the ability of the state and its society to protect and ensure the national interests and basic values. They are: the maintenance of the state independence, territorial integrity and democratic system of the Republic of Latvia, determined by the Satversme (Constitution), as well as ensuring the internal security of the state by guaranteeing compliance with the human rights, security and protection of the people.

The national interests also include ensuring of the preconditions necessary for a long-term development of the state and society: ensurance of the economic growth and welfare of the population, preservation of language and cultural identity, maintenance of defence system, preservation and development of scientific and technical potential, ensuring sustainable development of the environment, ensurance and development of state infrastructure and telecommunications, including ensurance and development of information technologies, maintenance of internal political stability, which is based on overall awareness of democratic development of the Republic of Latvia, development of unified civil society, which on the turn is based on the principle of equality of rights for all individuals.

¹⁰ In 1994, the OSCE adopted the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. While reaffirming the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the sovereign right of states, the Code contains a number of innovative positions on 'the democratic political control of military, paramilitary and internal security forces, as well as of intelligence services and the police to be an indispensable element of stability and security.

¹¹ For instance, the Legal-Political Assistance Group (LPAG) of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and the US Bar Association.

The ability of Latvia to ensure realisation of its national interests also depends on such external conditions as general environment of international relations and cooperation in the world and the region, international economic situation, global environmental quality.

In Slovenia, 'civilian control over the armed forces and, consequently, over the whole security system was one of the basic ideas about how to form an independent state'.¹² By reforming its security forces, Slovenia has paved a way out of the system that was dominated by the Federal Army (of the former Yugoslavia) and its secret police. As the most developed republic of the former federal state, Slovenia has successfully undertaken a range of structural and economic reforms, achieving today the level of a developed European state.

During the early 1990s, the three Baltic states struggled through a difficult process of 're-establishing the basics of nationhood and dismantling the Soviet system'.¹³ Fortunately, none of the Baltic states inherited the armed forces from the Soviet period. Consequently, the creation of national security and defence structures, including armed forces, border guard services, and new law enforcement mechanisms, were considered as one of the top priorities on the new governments' agendas. It was perceived as a prerequisite for sustaining independence gained after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The official applications of these countries for NATO membership in 1994 marked the beginning of a new stage of socio-political reforms, which included the adoption of laws related to national defence and the security system.¹⁴

Understanding of security in the Baltic region goes beyond the traditional concept. Transnational organised crime is seen as one of the greatest threats to the integrity of governments and the rule of law. Links between organised crime and terrorist networks are of the highest concern, especially the fear that Russian organised crime networks might help terrorist groups obtain nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or their precursors. At the same time, Russian political interest in and influence on events in the Baltic region has become marginal.

Southeast Europe

EU enlargement has highlighted the gap between the SEE countries and Baltic Group Plus. The transition to democracy is underway in Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova and Romania, though it lags behind in the most of Western Balkans where economic and cultural obstacles are intensified by contested borders. This is true for Serbia and Montenegro, where the survival of a common state is permanently challenged and the status of Kosovo is also far from being

¹² Jelusic, Ljubica, 'Security sector reform in Slovenia: Waging success and failure before the end of transition,' conference paper, DCAF, Geneva, August 2002, pp. 13-14.

¹³ Sapronas, Robert, 'Security sector reform in Lithuania: Theory and practice,' conference paper, DCAF, Geneva, August 2002.

¹⁴ The National Defense Law (1996), Lithuania National Defence Service Law (1998, amended 2000), Lithuania Law of Fundamentals of National Security Concept (1996).

resolved. Serbia still does not have a new constitution, and the aforementioned 'joint' state' was officially created in the spring of 2003 amidst wide spread chaos in its member state of Serbia, following the assassination of Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic. There is still latent unrest among the ethnic Albanian minority in Macedonia, which led to the outbreak of armed hostilities in 2001.

Bosnian Serbs and Croats in post-Dayton Bosnia are still restive and a vast majority of them remain true to the idea of one day reuniting with their homelands (Serbia and Croatia), while the Bosniaks are dissatisfied with what they consider the lack of centralisation in the country and want to concentrate more power in the capital of their State, Sarajevo. Integration into the European Union and membership of NATO as part of the enlargement process now under way provides an important incentive for reform, but this reform is, as mentioned earlier, not motivated by a genuine understanding of the inherent need for such changes, which leads to the process becoming mired down by inflated and unrealistic demands by the populace.

In the Western Balkans, many commanders in the armed forces, the secret police and paramilitary units have been involved in war crimes and are still linked to illegal trafficking of drugs, cigarettes and people. For this reason, in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia, they oppose any cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and continue to undermine attempts to place the military under civilian control, to extradite war criminals to the Hague tribunal and to try local 'mafia' at domestic courts. The police and judiciary are still poorly trained and equipped, which, combined with old mindsets, prevent them from effectively tackling crime.

One of the most worrying issues is the tightly woven network of organised crime that also involves politicians, police and the judiciary. These criminal networks are deliberately obstructing the emergence of a stronger rule of law, in particular increased transparency and accountability of the military and police, as well as a healthy market economy.¹⁵

Albania, one of the least developed countries of the Western Balkans region, has gone through a period of serious conflict and destabilisation due to the Yugoslav wars and the 1999 NATO intervention. An unusually radical reform and restructuring process in the economy, the military, and the police have accompanied Albania's transition. Organised crime, human and drug trafficking, and black market arms trade are chronic problems, which need to be tackled. Albania is a part of the EU Stabilisation and Association Process, the Partnership for Peace and Stability Pact and other security-related regional initiatives. Negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU started on 15 February 2003 and are expected to take

¹⁵ In Serbia, for example, Zoran Janjusevic, a security adviser of the assassinated Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic and a member of his National Security Council, the body put in place for civil oversight of Serbian state security, was a trusted member of Radovan Karadzic's secret police at the height of the Bosnia war. After the war in Bosnia, Janjusevic became one of the main suppliers of telecommunications equipment to Milosevic's interior ministry. He was earlier accused of criminal activities in his home country of Bosnia. The so-called 'Janjusevic-Kolesar affair' brought down the Serbian government and raises concerns about the authenticity of Serbian reforms.

some time. According to the European Commission¹⁶ Albania is still a rather unstable democracy, which has made only limited progress in addressing the main challenges it faces.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is also a war-torn society that is under a UN protectorate administered by the Office of High Representative. The Dayton Agreement (1995) retained Bosnia and Herzegovina's international boundaries and created a joint multi-ethnic and democratic government. This national government was charged with conducting foreign, economic, and fiscal policy. A second tier of government was also recognised, comprised of two entities roughly equal in size: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS). The Federation and RS governments were charged with overseeing internal functions. The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR), whose mission is to deter renewed hostilities, remains in place, with a declining number of troops. They are to eventually be replaced by EU forces. The last parliamentary elections show that deep ethnic divisions remain, with the same three nationalist parties that led the country to war regaining power.

Bulgaria has experienced positive economic growth rates since a major economic downturn in 1996. The current government, elected in 2001, has also pledged to continue political reforms, including the military and wider security system. The democratisation process keeps Bulgaria on a path towards integration into NATO and the EU, expected in 2007.

Although Croatia declared its independence from Yugoslavia in 1991, it took four years to resolve the conflicts with Bosnia and Serbia. Before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Croatia was, after Slovenia, the most prosperous and industrialised area, with a per capita output approximately one-third above the Yugoslav average. After the death of President Tudjman, his nationalistic government was voted out of power in January 2000. In the post-Tudjman era the country undertook some gradual reforms, particularly in the security system. Cooperation with the ICTY in the Hague and the repatriation of refugees are among the key political issues to be resolved prior to integration into EU. In the fall of 2003, new parliamentary elections returned the late Tudjman's HDZ nationalists to power, though there is some indication that the positions of extreme nationalist elements in the security systems and other segments of society are weakening.

After a decade of oppression under Milosevic, Kosovo came under UN administration (pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244) in 1999. In May 2001 international officials and local political parties (the Serbs refused to participate) agreed to a new Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government of Kosovo. This established a new parliament, which elected a new president, and laid the groundwork for a new local governmental structure. However, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) still has authority to govern the province and to disarm paramilitary units. Kosovo's still unresolved status hinders the development of clear policy and strategy with regard to the Stabilisation and Association process. KFOR, UNMIK Police and the Kosovo Police Service share in law

¹⁶ See the EC 2003 Stabilisation and Association Report published in March 2003.

enforcement and are under UN supervision. Their efforts to strengthen the rule of law are undermined by corruption and organised crime among the local political leadership, the guerrilla-military leadership, and militant Diaspora.

In the winter of 2003, dialogue began between the Serbian and Kosovo governments, under international supervision, in Vienna. UNMIK also introduced a list of standards that the provisional authorities would have to meet before any talks on the province's final status could begin. And, while most international organisations in the province insisted the status of ethnic minorities was steadily improving, a wave of violent attacks by ethnic Albanians against minority Serbs in mid-March 2004 shattered all illusions about a multi-ethnic Kosovo society being 'just around the corner.' This only reinforced demands by the newly elected Vojislav Kostunica government in Belgrade that the province be cantonised, with Serbs there gaining special autonomy rights

Macedonia is one of the former federal units of Yugoslavia populated by Slav Macedonians and Albanians. The new state was spared from the Balkans' wars by the deployment of the UN preventive peacekeeping mission in 1992. The outbreak of inter-ethnic conflict between Macedonians and Albanians in the spring of 2001 put to test all segments of the new Macedonian society, as well as the international community. The conflict was resolved through the efforts of the EU and NATO diplomacy in the fall of 2001 and formalised by the Ohrid Agreement.

Macedonia faces all the problems common to states where the democratic transition has been stalled and society torn by war. These include criminalised and oversized armed forces, uncontrolled paramilitary units, and corrupt political elites. The presence of the NATO/EU forces preserves a fragile peace. The commitment of international organisations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UNDP and many other institutions has played an important role in preventing the dissolution of Macedonia into Slav and Albanian parts. While the Macedonian government has been very actively involved in a range of regional security initiatives, the strong influence of former Albanian National Liberation Army (UÇK) guerrillas in the country's economic and political life raises concerns about the trajectory of SSR, particularly since these same individuals are often tied to organised crime.

Since Moldova obtained its independence from the Soviet Union on 27 August 1991, the country has remained divided, with the Transnistrian region along the Ukrainian border controlled by separatist forces. The new communist government that came to power in February 2001 elections has shown increased determination to resolve the ongoing conflict over the status of that region. Recent progress by Russia to destroy the weapons and munitions of the Organised Group of Russian Forces stationed in Transnistria has raised hopes for peaceful resolution of the conflict. Like many other former Soviet republics, Moldova is experiencing severe economic difficulties. During 2001 Moldova joined the WTO and the Southeast Europe Stability Pact. It is a member of the Council of Europe and has signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. Politically the Communist Party

government is committed to dealing with social issues including individual security, health and education.

In Romania, there is a widely shared belief among political parties on the desirability of rapid integration with NATO and the European Union (of which Romania is a candidate country). Romania was not invited to join NATO at the summit in Prague 2002, in part because democratic control of the armed forces is so weak. Structural reforms are slow due to an extremely heavy and cumbersome bureaucracy and excessive regulations and administrative control. That partly explains the high incidence of corruption and very slow and cosmetic military and security-related reforms to date. The judiciary and parliament are still too weak to control the executive branch of government in any meaningful way.

The overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000 finally allowed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (since March 2003 called Serbia and Montenegro—SaM)¹⁷ to embark on a much-delayed process of political and economic reforms. The cumbersome, 18-party Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) coalition government took power and immediately started a successful return to membership of international institutions. However, achievements on the domestic front were not matched in the foreign policy arena. The major problem SaM faces is sustaining the alliance of the two states, reforming the former Yugoslav Army, and the unresolved status of Kosovo. A not less complicated problem is how to establish the rule of law and an impartial judiciary, not to mention placing the executive power under democratic control after decades of authoritarianism and corruption. Most of the Serbian ‘oligarchs’ in the security institutions successfully survived the soft political transition that occurred in October 2000.

The weak minority government that came to power after the 2003 assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic rules with the support of the former Milosevic party. Early indicators show that ‘soldier/businessman oligarchs’ retain huge influence over the security system, or possess their own ‘parallel’ security structures, making genuine SSR next to impossible. These secret police forces are behind most of the criminal activities in the country and, in this context, the question of whether there is enough ‘civil control’ over the ‘official’ services is a moot point.

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Ethnicity, religion and the region’s overall cultural diversity are fundamental to understanding the conflicts and instability that have prevailed in the CIS states during the last decade. These conflicts, however, were in large part the result of policy choices of the new political classes in the CIS that mainly consists of ‘converts’ from the old Soviet ‘nomenclature.’

¹⁷ Under strong pressure from the European Union, the parliaments of Serbia and Montenegro and consequently the Yugoslav parliament adopted the Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on 5 February 2003, putting an end to the Yugoslav Federation and opening negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU. In April 2003, Serbia and Montenegro was admitted into the Council of Europe, which was also seen as an act of encouragement to continue and intensify cooperation with the ICTY, the fight against organised crime and work on economic and political reform.

The three states of the South Caucasus face many of the developmental and security problems that plague other former Soviet republics, including weak transparency, rule of law, and democratic institutions. In Georgia, problems with separatism persist in the regions of Abkhazia, Adjara, and Javakhetia, each of which could potentially re-ignite civil war. One of the most serious obstacles to Georgia's acceptance into NATO is the absence of government control over the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Armenia and Azerbaijan only enjoy basic diplomatic relations, a result of their war over Nagorno-Karabakh during the early 1990s. Despite a nine-year cease-fire, no final peace deal has been reached. A volatile mix of regional conflicts is intensified by the presence of Russian military bases in both countries. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was also exacerbated by Russia's attempt to keep a balancing role in the region.

The situation in the Russian Federation is even more complex. The country has only achieved a slight recovery after the economic crisis that struck in 1998 which hampers the broader political reform agenda.¹⁸ Serious problems persist, including widespread corruption, lack of a strong legal system and independent judiciary. Russia inherited a bulky military sector and an extensive network of secret police forces. The per capita size of the Russian military force today is in fact higher than that of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Russia has kept some 80 per cent of the Soviet military machine, while inheriting only 50 per cent of the Soviet Union's resources, population and natural wealth. Russia is a top producer and exporter of military and police equipment. The war in Chechnya in the mid-1990s caused the radicalisation of Russian military as well as the Chechen guerrillas. Chechnya continues to be a haven for mafia groups and international terrorists. The war in Iraq and Putin's more open and flexible foreign policy have nonetheless allowed closer ties with the EU and created a window of opportunity for broader domestic reforms.

The recent expansion of NATO to include the former East Bloc states of Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania caused fierce reactions in Moscow, coming as a surprise to Alliance officials after the Russians' heretofore lukewarm response to NATO encroaching closer on their borders. The Russian legislature (State Duma) denounced the expansion, calling for Putin to withdraw from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, while top government officials, including the defense minister and deputy army chief of staff, warned of an 'adequate response' and 'reformulating' their country's nuclear arms doctrine to counter the NATO move. The Russian 'sabre-rattling' came at a time when Putin was ordering some of the most dramatic reforms of so-called 'power agencies' (government bodies that report directly to him), including the foreign affairs, defense, interior, justice and emergency situations ministries and security and intelligence services, in an attempt to downsize these clumsy bureaucracies and bring them under tighter control. Notwithstanding these moves, serious obstacles remain to SSR

¹⁸ See the discussion in Arbatov, Aleksei G., 'The national idea and national security', *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, no. 5, May 1998, p. 5-21, and no. 6, April 1998, pp. 5-19.

in Russia, including resistance within the security systems themselves and possible rogue elements among the 20,000 former KGB officers now privately engaged in security-related fields, some of whom are purported to have ties to 'black-market' arms dealers and terrorist groups.

After seven decades as a constituent republic of the USSR, Belarus attained its independence in 1991. The country is led by Europe's last dictator, Alyaksandr Lukashenka and has retained close political and economic ties with Russia. The two countries signed a treaty in 1999 envisioning greater political and economic integration. Belarus has seen little structural reform since 1995. The country inherited a large military industrial complex from the former USSR. Between 1996 and 2000, Belarus ranked tenth in major arms exports in the world. Lukashenka's command economy has precluded sustained recovery of the kind now experienced by neighbouring Ukraine and Russia. Belarus also has the highest inflation rate in the CIS. The country remains in self-imposed isolation from the West.

The Republic of Ukraine, which used to be the Soviet Union's wheat basket and produced up to a third of Soviet armaments, has long experienced a split between its Russian-speaking East and the more nationalistic West. Industrialised eastern Ukraine, which suffered the most from the Soviet collapse, tends to be more in favour of integration with Russia. Western Ukraine, which has been a part of Austro-Hungary and Poland is dominated by nationalists who want closer ties with Europe and NATO. However, the country is still under the strong influence of Moscow since many of the former Soviet political cadres remain entrenched, stalling efforts at economic reform, privatisation, and civil liberties. In part due to problems of corruption, Ukraine was not invited to sign a Membership Action Plan (MAP) during the NATO summit in Prague in November 2002.

Chapter 4

How security is defined

The notion that the quality of governance in general, and of the security system in particular, are relevant for internal peace and prosperity is gradually gaining political legitimacy in most of the countries surveyed.¹⁹ Political accountability and transparency have become an important benchmark which governments have started to consider in SSR and wider socio-economic reforms. Some governments now also place structural security threats such as crime, corruption, and ethnic conflict at the apex of security policy, as in the case of Latvia, Georgia, and Russia.

Most of the countries surveyed are revising or writing new national security concepts and defense doctrines. The security challenges differ from the early 1990s because most countries now perceive internal conflicts as the major challenges to their security. These new concerns, that extend beyond the responsibilities and capabilities of traditional military and police, require a broader approach that involves building basic political consensus on how to create a functioning state and healthy civil society.

The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (NSC), signed by President Putin on 10 January 2000, proceeds from the assessment that the main threats now and in the foreseeable future do not have a military orientation, but are predominantly internal in nature and arise from political, economic, social, environmental and technological issues. It emphasises that the critical state of the economy, the deterioration in inter-ethnic relations, and the social polarisation of Russian society create a direct threat to the country's national security.

Therefore, the new notions of security that are emerging in the Baltic states, SEE and CIS at an official level broadly cover similar components to the DAC definitions, with particular emphasis on corruption, organised crime, and terrorism. Throughout all three regions, corruption is recognised as a security issue par-excellence. It is perceived as posing a real threat to new states by eroding the rule of law and undermining the trust and confidence of citizens in the fairness and impartiality of the new democratic institutions.

¹⁹ See Hanggi, Heiner, 'Good governance of the security sector: Its relevance for confidence building', paper presented at the seminar Practical Confidence-Building Measures: Does Good Governance of the Security Sector Matter? held in New York, October 2002, sponsored by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security.

While political jargon in the surveyed regions is rich with phrases that reflect the impact of the international community on policy documents and political declarations about security, it does not, however, signify genuine local ownership of declared reform programmes or new concepts of security such as SSR. The term 'security-sector reform'—though widely used in the former Yugoslavia, for example—often has a different meaning for those using it. Few people in the region, including policymakers and members of security establishments, view security in a holistic sense. The general public probably knows a significant amount about the way their security services work, but this knowledge is firmly rooted in the old communist model of security systems existing for the sole purpose of defending the ruling elite.

Chapter 5

Assessment of findings

In the period since 1989, civil-security relations in the Baltics, SEE states, and the CIS have undergone—and continue to undergo—profound changes. These changes, which are common to the most of observed countries, encompass the following:

- Adoption of new constitutions and laws that give power to legislators and establish civil control of the military.
- Setting up a dividing line between political and military leaders.
- Restructuring and downsizing of armed forces.
- Increasing transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes.
- Reforming judiciaries and training of judges.
- Reforming police services.

While the nature of these changes differs substantially between countries and regions, several common themes are observable, and clear patterns in the development of civil-security relations are emerging. These common themes are changes in the military's relationship with governance, demilitarisation of areas of society that were militarised under communism, reduction of military influence, and changes of attitudes and perceptions of the role of security forces in society. The military enjoys a new-found legitimacy in many countries that is linked to their central importance in the accession of countries to NATO and by implication, to other Western regional institutions. Internally, the legitimacy of the reformed military has been reinforced by their role in—or potential for—aid to the civil authority in times of crisis.

Governments of the Baltic countries and Slovenia have been the most successful thus far in building a broad-based concept of security, which they see as key to fostering economic growth, social stability, and respect for law and order. The new concepts emerged in the 1990s in the face of resistance from the old 'guard'. However, backed by the success of rapid economic reforms and integration into the EU and NATO, democratic parties have

managed to achieve consensus about the strategic priorities of national security.

Compared with the Baltics and Slovenia, the process in SEE and CIS countries has been slower and more politically controversial due to the generally slower pace of economic and political reforms. A potential obstacle to further change is a resurgence of the influence of old communist party officials who resist economic liberalisation and attempts to re-allocate the national wealth. This has resulted in the creation of informal power centres within new political parties. Affiliation with the 'right' political party is still the key to a successful political career, as are links with former secret police and military intelligence. Paramilitary and internal security forces as well as intelligence services, police and border guards remain outside of any meaningful civil control in many SEE and CIS states, particularly those emerging from conflict (see Box 4).

Box 4. The enduring influence of the KGB

The Soviet Union's Committee for State Security (KGB) was dissolved along with the state it served in late 1991, following an aborted coup attempt by hard-line KGB and other Soviet leaders. However, most activities and assets of the KGB continued to function as separate intelligence, counterintelligence, presidential secret service, and telecommunications agencies of the Russian Federation, with the Russian president and government initially resisting attempts by the legislature to reunify the country's security system. The rise to power of former KGB officer Vladimir Putin and his election as president, after the 1998 economic downturn, drastically affected the entire course of Russian reforms, including SSR. Most analysts point to the increasingly predominant influence of so-called '*siloviki*' ('strongmen', i.e. former KGB, defense and interior ministry officers now engaged by the government in many top posts) in Russian politics and economy over the last four years of Putin's presidency.

Counter-acting mechanisms of accountability in governments are either weak or non-existent. Corruption in the public service, the weakness of civil society, and dysfunctional parliaments slow down the process of SSR. In CIS countries, control of the state security apparatus is typically in the hands of one man—the president—who has reproduced the role of the old Party Secretary-General. Such presidential control is, however, undermined by the 'Oligarchs', a mixture of the old and the new interest groups, which are independent and uncontrollable. This dichotomy further weakens already weak state institutions.

Flagging economies, poor infrastructure, and low birth rates are seen by many analysts as additional obstacles to broader reform. The new National Security Concept of the Russian Federation recognises all of these challenges, emphasising the importance of establishing a functioning central government able to create 'favourable conditions for the development of the individual and society, including upholding the constitution, law and order, and maintaining a friendly international environment'.²⁰

²⁰ See Tsygankov, Andrei, 'From international institutionalism to revolutionary expansionism: The foreign policy discourse of contemporary Russia', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 41, no. 2, November 1997.

New national security concepts and other political and legal documents are full of terms and phrases such as ‘accountability and transparency’, ‘good governance’, ‘legitimacy through democratic participation’, ‘respect for human rights and the rule of law’, ‘parliamentary and civil control of the military’, etc. While the Westernisation of political jargon is an important step in creating a new political culture, it is hard to assess how many of those who use the new political jargon believe in its substance. A significant number of trainings initiatives, seminars, exchange programmes and other activities have been organised for parliamentarians, state administrative personnel, young politicians and party members. The country data gathered during the survey shows the richness of activities focused on strengthening institutional and political culture.

Attempts have been made to give elected Parliaments across the region a measure of control over crucial decisions affecting national defence and security, such as approval of budgets, the declaration of war and peace, passage of security-related laws, monitoring of weapons procurement, ratification of international agreements, and authorisation of the deployment of troops for internal emergency situations and abroad (for example, Art. 92 of the Constitution of Slovenia). In most countries, however, these mechanisms do not function yet and are often perceived as a ‘favour’ to the donor community. With the exception of Slovenia, and to an extent the Baltic countries, parliamentary and other civil oversight bodies need significantly more experience and management skills.

Weak points in SSR processes relate to the development of a longer term-strategic vision for change, particularly in the military domain. This has partly been compensated for by the process of integration into the EU and NATO, which has become both a new political mantra and provided a blueprint for reforms. The external vision has had an enormous impact in all SEE countries, and in most CIS states. One significant concrete benefit has been the closing of specialised military tribunals in almost all countries. Yet, as Box 5 suggests, one needs to be cautious about over-stating the degree to which SSR goals have been achieved. Current international efforts to support SSR have to date focused primarily on spreading Western norms and practices to inform how the security sector should operate.

Box 5. Separating ‘profound’ from ‘cosmetic’ reforms

The key to assessing the success of SSR across the Baltics, SEE and CIS states lies in separating ‘profound’ SSR, that leads to open and transparent democratic governance, from cosmetic reforms undertaken to please international donors, NATO, the EU and other international actors. A typical example of superficial reforms is the restructuring and downsizing of the armed forces, and modernisation of police structures and border guards, without strengthening parliamentary and other forms of civil oversight mechanisms. This underscores the need to create a public and political environment that is supportive of genuine democratic reform. This task can only be achieved with, on the one hand, the support of military and police leaders and, on the other, the creation of a class of well-educated, effective and highly professional public servants.

Enhancing public oversight of state security bodies by means of political parties, NGOs, independent media, specialised think tanks and academic institutions should be very high on the reform agenda. Until recently, there has been little or no cooperation between these kinds of organisations and national parliaments, while the military and intelligence were perceived as being above public control. Today, national defence planning and budgeting processes are becoming more transparent. National security concepts, though still vague and often ambiguous in many cases, are increasingly the subject of public debate.

Another significant SSR challenge is ensuring that the radical economic and monetary reforms introduced by the international financial institutions in the transition countries do not undermine the social and economic welfare of populations, including general law and order. None of the governments have successfully reconciled these competing goals, nor have they addressed these challenges in their national security concepts.

In summary, the key SSR priorities facing the Baltic, SEE and CIS states are the following:

Military reform remains an overwhelming priority for assistance by NATO and other international institutions because of the weakness of internal democratic forces and the persisting influence of the old pillars of the former totalitarian states—the army and secret police. Key issues include the demobilisation and reintegration of military personnel, the restructuring of the military secret police, and the strengthening of civil oversight over all aspects of the state security apparatus, including military industry and the arms trade.

The reform of *intelligence services* seems to be the weakest point in this process, and it remains the only sector not addressed by international assistance. The global ‘war on terror’, together with organised crime, drugs and human trafficking have been used as alibis to exclude executive power from democratic control, and even to justify secret police control over legislators and judiciaries. For example, the governments of SCG, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Russia have at best only partial control over the intelligence services, because neither parliaments nor judiciaries have subpoena power over them.

There are nonetheless indications that the international community has decided to be more actively involved in this field. Recently, the UN High Representative in Bosnia has made an effort to merge all ethnic intelligence agencies into a single state-wide service. After September 11, the US has become more active in Republika Srpska and Serbia. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic, intelligence services in SCG have been under investigation for their alleged links to organised crime.

All countries in the surveyed regions are attempting to *reform the police*. In SEE, for example, almost ten per cent of registered projects in the Stability Pact data base relate to police reform, with many more activities still to be registered. These projects address issues such as transparency and accountability within individual police forces, restructuring of the police to create more specialised units, creation of community policing, the

establishment of multi-ethnic policing, and the de-militarisation of police forces that have been used in ethnic conflicts.

There are three main areas where unreformed police forces have a serious detrimental impact on development and pose a threat to stability across the regions surveyed, though particularly the CIS countries:

- First, police forces and the justice system are not effective in countering serious criminal and terrorist threats. Although in some instances the police have done valuable work, a combination of high-level corruption, lack of professionalism, lack of cooperation with the general public, and serious resource limitations or misdirection of funds has allowed these threats to flourish.
- Secondly, police forces are largely seen as the coercive branch of government rather than a neutral, service-oriented force that ensures law and order for all. They are involved in widespread human rights abuses that have estranged them from the public they are supposed to serve. Abuses by the police, including torture, have fuelled support for extremist groups and enhanced the risk the region faces from terrorism.
- Thirdly, security forces are acting as a brake on economic progress. Security is a key concern for domestic business and international investors but too often the police are not seen as defenders of business from criminals. Instead they are often involved in extortion rackets, costing business significant profits, or are directly involved in organised crime.

Much has also been achieved in *reforming the judiciary* mainly due to international assistance, though these efforts are also constrained by the challenges of police reform noted above. There are a great number of actors in this field and coordination is poor. Due to the presence of both Anglo-Saxon and European legal experts, there is also an overlap between the two legal systems (for example, in Albania or Georgia). However, in all countries, except Slovenia, the judicial sector remains one of the weakest links in the entire security system. Many legal reforms end at the point where legislation is adopted, while a very weak enforcement mechanisms fail to ensure that legislation is actually implemented. The reasons are corrupt and incompetent judiciaries, inefficient public administrations and weak civil society capacity to monitor these reforms.

Civil society has undergone remarkable development in recent years, particularly with regard to the protection of human rights and media freedoms. Nevertheless, active civil society engagement in SSR remains limited, particularly in terms of contributing to the development of policy in the security arena.

The *return of displaced persons and refugees*, particularly minorities, is an important security issues in all post-conflict societies in the regions surveyed, though not an SSR issue per se. This is a very slow process, often politically controversial, and its progress is directly linked to the success of security

reforms (i.e. ensuring the safety of returnees). Weak economies make the re-integration of refugees into society even more difficult.

In the area of *arms control and non-proliferation* international actors are the driving force. They are involved at various levels in regional arms control and confidence building activities. There is some overlap between the work of the SALW, OSCE, NATO and other institutions that are active in all three regions. However, progress towards the destruction of landmine stockpiles is well advanced, particularly in Albania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Anti-corruption activities form a part of good governance and transparency initiatives. Strengthening 'freedom of information' legislation is a significant challenge in efforts to combat corruption, yet such activities have not received adequate emphasis in SSR programmes. Domestic Transparency International (TI) branches in the region (notably in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) have been founded only recently. In Albania—which has one of the region's most serious corruption problems—no TI chapter exists.

The fight against *organised crime* is directly linked to other activities in the area of police and border guards reform, or reform of judiciaries. Money laundering is a significant problem in this field. There are many programmes in this area, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, Albania and Russia. Across the SEE states, the factors that make organised crime a problem are the same: their strategic location on Europe's border with Asia, weak and fractured political and legal systems in which organised crime exploits a 'single criminal space' unlimited by economic, political, ethnic or geographical boundaries, and the damaging legacy of early 1990s conflicts.

Like their counterparts in other countries, Russia's organised crime groups focus on the standard thugs' menu: drug trafficking, racketeering, prostitution, smuggling, theft, money laundering, contract killing, and the like. The difference in Russia is the deep penetration of organised crime into normally licit activities of government and business. This increases the possibility of the involvement of organised crime in the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, or even influencing state policy in ways that threaten the security of other countries. International multi- and bilateral cooperation is crucial in preventing organised crime from penetrating into politics, the civil service and local administrations.

Terrorism, terrorist organisations and extremist groups are not characteristic of the Baltic states, Slovenia and most of the SEE countries. However, terrorism is a potentially destabilising factor in Russia and some of the other CIS countries. Efforts to combat this problem are only now receiving greater attention and will require a strong legal framework and effective international partnerships.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

To address the wide array of problems identified by this survey, SSR must incorporate a strong developmental emphasis. So far, the international focus has been on post-conflict situations, but SSR is also important for conflict prevention across all of the regions surveyed.

Much international assistance for SSR in SEE and CIS countries continues to focus on bilateral training and technical assistance, with little attention to structural reform or cultural change in the security domain. Most technical assistance actually goes for high-tech solutions, largely determined by donor preferences, which are often ineffective and ill-suited to the needs of beneficiaries. Ideally, all technical assistance should be linked to reform-oriented outcomes and serve as a stimulus to changes of political culture.

The obstacles to SSR should not be underestimated. Interior ministries, for instance, are politically powerful in many of the former communist states, particularly the CIS. In many cases, they have little incentive to change if that means undermining their personal political and financial power bases. Many have experienced previous reforms that have done little except to introduce new security concepts that are not locally owned. Reforms have to take into account this internal opposition.

One of the most important goals must be to develop appreciation among security forces of the long-term benefits of reforms. Without that, there is little hope for substantial reform. To this end, SSR must entail the strengthening of political parties (i.e. a real democratic opposition) that can encourage and facilitate dialogues that will lead to a national consensus about the minimum standards for governance of the security system.

Annex A

Selected bibliography of SSR in the Baltics, Southeast Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States

Born, H., Fluri, P., and Johnsson, A. (eds), *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices*, handbook for Parliamentarians no. 5, Geneva: IPU/CAF, 2003.

Caparini, M., 'Security sector reform and NATO and EU enlargements', *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Caparini, M. and Marenin, Otwin (eds), *Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe. Process and Progress*, Münster: Lit Verlag, 2004.

Ebnoether, A and Gustenau, G. (eds), *Security Sector Governance in the Southern Caucasus: Challenges and Visions*, Vienna: National Defence Academy Austria and Geneva: DCAF, 2004.

Forster, A., 'Civil-military relations and security sector reform: West looking East', 2000, <http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/papers/ISF_WS_III-4_Forster.pdf>.

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), <http://www.dcaf.ch>.

Germann, W. and Edmunds, T. (eds), *Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment*, Baden-Baden: DCAF and Bonn International Centre for Conversion, 2003.

Greenwood, D. and Huisman, S. (eds), *Transparency and Accountability of Police Forces, Security Services and Intelligence Agencies*, Sofia: George C. Marshall Association, Bulgaria, 2004.

Gyarmati, I. (ed.) and Vessel, S. (asst. ed.), *Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans 2003-2004*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, March 2004.

Internet Resource Centre on Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe <http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/>.

Gordon Peake, 'Policing the peace: Policy reform experiences in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia', report, London: Saferworld, 2004.

South Eastern Europe Regional Documentation Network, <http://www.seedon.org/>.